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Abstract – Econometricians have long studied the effect of price on residential water 9 
demand and the impact on water use of the rate (tariff) structure in which price signals 10 
are embedded. This paper applies an existing deductive model of residential water use 11 
for the intermittent supply system in Amman, Jordan and simulates demand responses 12 
across a cross-section of households over many uniform, increasing block, and linear 13 
price (quadratic charge) rate structures at historically low and significantly higher prices. 14 
Results show inelastic piped water demand responses for all rate structures at 15 
historically low prices similar to findings from a prior econometric study for Amman. 16 
However, piped water demand turns more elastic when prices rise above $0.50/m3 with 17 
uniform rates showing the most elastic response. But results also highlight several 18 
complications to determine and interpret price elasticity of demand under different rate 19 
structures. They also illustrate tradeoffs among rate structures and rate structure 20 
components for key rate setting objectives such as to encourage water conservation, 21 
recover costs, promote efficiency and more equitably allocate costs among users. 22 
Keywords: household, water, demand, price schedule, price elasticity, simulation-optimization 23 
Introduction 24 
Water utility managers and economists have long been interested in the effect of price on household 25 
water use as a tool to manage demand (Howe and Linaweaver 1967; Young 2005). Econometric studies 26 
typically quantify price effects as elasticities that express the percentage change in water use associated 27 
with a one percent increase in price. Price-elasticity of water demand is generally observed as negative 28 
and less than 1 in absolute value (inelastic). However, significant differences exist and relate to the 29 
econometric regression technique, price specification, and rate structure in the study area (Dalhuisen et 30 
al. 2003; Espey et al. 1997). Of particular interest is how to incorporate flat charges, variable prices, and 31 
nonlinear rate structures that present different prices for different levels of water use.  32 
When setting prices, utilities often grapple with conflicting objectives such as to promote efficiency, 33 
encourage conservation, maintain revenue neutrality (generate revenues only to recover costs), achieve 34 
equity, make rates easy to implement and transparent to users, plus satisfy other political aims 35 
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(Chesnutt and Beecher 1998; Hanemann 1998). Balancing these many considerations is difficult and 36 
there is no single method or technique utilities use to identify and set prices. 37 
Even resolving influences of the rate structure on water use or conservation potential through 38 
econometric (regression) analysis has proved tricky. First, price varies with water use in nonlinear price 39 
structures such as increasing or declining block rates (IBR and DBR) or linear price (resulting in quadratic 40 
charge) schemes. Thus, price is endogenous (Olmstead et al. 2007). Second, using marginal or average 41 
prices in regressions can change interpretations of price responses (Young 2005). Third, flat charges for 42 
connection and metering fees plus IBR or DBR price blocks can confound the calculation of price, 43 
particularly average price. Fourth, households often know little about prices and the rate structures in 44 
which prices are embedded; this ignorance affects price responses (Agthe et al. 1988; Carter and Milon 45 
2005; Gaudin 2006). Further, ex-post billing, excluding price information from bills, or bundling water 46 
with other utility services make price information less transparent to customers (Gaudin 2006). Fifth, 47 
low water prices in the U.S. (Brookshire et al. 2002) and Jordan (Alqam et al. 2008) have limited the 48 
range of prices over which demand responses have been observed. 49 
Sixth and finally, results are mixed from the few individual studies (Table 1) and meta analyses (Table 2) 50 
that have tried to differentiate the demand effects of multiple rate structures (Dalhuisen et al. 2003; 51 
Espey et al. 1997; Kenney et al. 2008; Nieswiadomy and Cobb 1993; Nieswiadomy and Molina 1989; 52 
Olmstead et al. 2007; Stevens et al. 1992). Curiously, the individual studies attempt to quantify rate 53 
structure effects as price elasticities of demand, imply that rate structure changes shift demand, and/or 54 
embed rate structure differences into average or marginal price variables. Yet, a monopolist water utility 55 
that changes prices and the rate structure in which prices are embedded may only influence where 56 
along the supply curve users choose to situate their water use. Further, different elasticity responses 57 
may relate to different data analyzed (aggregate, panel, etc.), omitted variables that correlate with 58 
price, a sample selection bias potentially present in panel studies (Nieswiadomy and Cobb 1993), or how 59 
the actual rate structure in the study area mathematically interacts with the modeled  price variable 60 
(average, marginal, Shin, etc.). 61 
To identify the effects of different rate structures and price schedules with a single cross-sectional 62 
sample, this paper applies an existing deductive model of individual household water use for Amman, 63 
Jordan (Rosenberg et al. 2007). We simulate several rate structures for public, piped water over a 64 
variety of historical and higher price schedules. The Amman system is intermittently operated and 65 
typically supplies customers for only 12 to 72 hours per week. Thus, customers also adopt a range of 66 
alternative supply, coping behaviors, and even discontinue piped water service when its cost, 67 
availability, or reliability are lacking. To represent these conditions, the deductive model identifies the 68 
expected, cost-minimizing mix of piped water and alternative supply, conservation, local storage, and 69 
water quality improvement actions an individual household can adopt to meet its water needs. We use 70 
Monte-Carlo simulations to represent household heterogeneity. We calculate an average and marginal 71 
price for each rate structure and price schedule, observe changes in these prices and household water 72 
use over different price schedules, and from these intermediary results calculate a price elasticity of 73 
demand for each rate structure. The deductive model requires significant time to construct, detailed 74 
water-related behavioral data specific to the study area, is limited by the user actions and substitution 75 
Page 4 
opportunities programmed in, makes assumptions on the initial water required for household activities, 76 
uses an imperfect decision criteria, and is partially validated against econometric results of observed 77 
water use behaviors. However, deductive modeling and rate structure simulation allow cross-sectional 78 
analysis in a single community for numerous pricing mechanisms at existent and higher prices. Further, 79 
results can include tradeoffs between rate structures and rate structure components for important rate 80 
setting objectives such as to promote efficiency, encourage water conservation, recover costs, and more 81 
equitably allocate costs among users. This information is timely as the Amman water utility seeks new 82 
price mechanisms to better recover utility costs from customers (Alqam et al. 2008). 83 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the deductive model formulation, inputs, and 84 
outputs. Subsequent sections present and discuss the rate structures and price schedules simulated, 85 
model results, and conclusions. 86 
Deductive Model of Water Use 87 
The deductive model identifies an individual household’s expected, cost-minimizing mix of public, piped 88 
water supply, alternative sources, conservation actions, local storage enhancements, and water quality 89 
improvements having variable costs, availabilities, reliabilities, and qualities to meet initial estimates of 90 
the household’s water use requirements across a probability distribution of piped water availability. The 91 
action mix includes many water-related actions users take in intermittent systems and can include 92 
alternative sources and coping behaviors in lieu of public, piped water. See Rosenberg et al. (2007) for 93 
full details. This section reviews the model formulation, inputs, outputs, calibration, and verification. 94 
Household water management actions include 39 potential long-term infrastructure investments 95 
(connecting to the piped water network, installing roof or ground-level storage tanks, water efficient 96 
appliances, xeriscaping, drip irrigation systems, etc.) and short-term coping actions (such as purchasing 97 
water from private vendors, borrowing from neighbors, or modifying behaviors to, for example, take 98 
shorter or less frequent showers or stress-irrigate landscaping). This action set is much more expansive 99 
than prior deductive models of water use (Garcia-Alcubilla and Lund 2006; Howe et al. 1971). 100 
The deductive model draws on different empirical data and studies for Amman, Jordan to characterize 101 
potential household actions, behaviors, and conditions (Rosenberg et al. 2008; Rosenberg et al. 2007). In 102 
all, we use available empirical data and engineering judgment to develop probability distributions for 103 
some 126 parameters that influence action costs, life spans, availability and reliability, effective water 104 
volume added or conserved, and initial estimates of a household’s water use requirements. Probability 105 
distributions include uniform, normal, exponential decay, fitted gamma, and histograms and depend on 106 
prior available empirical data (Rosenberg et al. 2007). Some parameters (like household size, rainfall, 107 
and landscaped area) have direct analogues to econometric model variables. We disaggregate other 108 
typical econometric variables (like price, building age, education level, and income that are proxies for 109 
phenomena of interest like the rate structure, stock of water use appliances, or conservation 110 
mindedness of users) into separate parameters such as prices and block spacing, flow rates for each 111 
water appliance, lengths and frequencies of appliance uses, etc. And still other parameters like 112 
availabilities (water volumes) and reliabilities (probabilities) of piped water and alternative sources 113 
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(typically absent from econometric studies) represent intermittent system characteristics that may force 114 
households to adopt alternative supplies or actions when piped water supply is insufficient. The model 115 
for Amman assumes households face three discrete water availability-reliability events: (i) summer 116 
weeks with shortage, and (ii) summer and (iii) winter weeks with full availability. In all, probability 117 
distributions for the 126 parameters comprise household demographic, geographic, technological, 118 
behavioral, cost, and water availability factors that influence a household’s water use. 119 
We used Monte-Carlo simulations to sample from the 126 probability distributions. Second, we 120 
combined sampled values using explicit formulas to estimate optimization model inputs for a large 121 
number of simulated customers. Sampling and combining allows detailed disaggregation, correlation, 122 
and contingent sampling among the 126 parameters to create a heterogeneous cross-sectional sample 123 
of households. Third, we ran the optimization model for each simulated customer to identify the 124 
expected (probability-weighted) cost-minimizing strategy (piped water supply, alternative sources, 125 
conservation actions, etc., associated water use and charges for those actions) the household would 126 
choose to meet its water use requirements across all availability events. And fourth, we recorded 127 
averages and distributions of optimization results. 128 
Rosenberg et al. (2007) discuss model calibration to the cumulative distribution of piped water billed to 129 
Amman residential customers in 2005. They adjusted only 1 of 126 empirical parameters, occupancy, 130 
and used the historical mixed IBR/linear price (quadratic charge) rate structure for combined piped 131 
water and sewerage charges in place between 2001 and 2005. This rate structure had four blocks with 132 
flat, uniform, and linear prices for use below, respectively, 20, 40, and 130 m3/customer/quarter. Use 133 
above 130 m3/customer/quarter reverted to a uniform price. Prices ranged from $0.26/m3 in block 2, 134 
$0.81 to $3.27/m3 in block 3, and $1.75/m3 in block 4. The modeled piped water use averaged 152 135 
m3/customer/year with 45% of customers using less than 90 m3/customer/year. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov 136 
(K-S) test showed the calibration fit significant at the 98% level. 137 
Rosenberg et. al (2007) further verified the deductive model against (i) an empirical distribution of 138 
willingness-to-pay to avoid network shortages reported by a contingent valuation survey of 1,000 139 
Amman households (Theodory 2000), and (ii) demand responses to the Amman price schedules 140 
instituted in 1997, 2001 (base calibration), and 2006. The three historical price schedules had the same 141 
block spacing and pricing mechanisms. The 2001 schedule increased all uniform sewerage prices from 142 
1997 by 12% while the 2006 schedule further increased flat charges in each block by amounts ranging 143 
from $US 2.33 to 5.15/customer/quarter. We simulated each price schedule, observed the average 144 
piped water use, and calculated an average price (total utility revenues from all simulated customers 145 
divided by the total piped water use). We estimated a slope from the changes in piped water use and 146 
calculated average prices across the three price schedules, then calculated a point price elasticity of 147 
demand from the slope at the base calibration piped water use and average price (Rosenberg et al. 148 
2007, Table 1). This calculated elasticity was close to the price elasticity of demand reported by an 149 
econometric study of Amman households over the same time period (Salman et al. 2008). 150 
The remainder of this paper simulates piped water use and calculates ssociated price elasticities of 151 
demand for several alternative uniform, IBR, and linear price (quadratic charge) rate structures at 152 
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historical and higher prices. Analysis focuses on demand responses, economic efficiency, cost allocation 153 
among and recovery from users, and tradeoffs between rate structure components. 154 
Rate Structures Simulated 155 
Figure 1 shows how marginal prices and total charges can vary with consumption for several rate 156 
structures. From the figure, note: 157 
1. Raising or lowering the price schedule for one rate structure relative to others can adjust price 158 
ordering and test, through simulation, effects to increase prices. 159 
2. A uniform rate structure with no flat fee plots at the same marginal price as a uniform rate with 160 
a flat fee (assuming the uniform prices are the same). 161 
3. When use by all users facing an IBR falls in the first block, the IBR is effectively a uniform 162 
structure. Raising prices in higher use blocks will not impact water use. To study this effect, we 163 
introduce simulations that hold IBR prices constant but shrink block widths (spacing). 164 
Table 3 presents the 53 price schedules simulated for 4 different rate structures. IBR price schedules 165 
maintained historical block spacing but varied prices in each block from ½ to 8 times their historical 166 
values. IBR with shrinking block width price schedules held prices in each block constant at 1.5 times 167 
their historical values but varied block widths for the first 3 blocks from 1.5 to 0.25 times their historical 168 
values. Linear price (quadratic total charge) schedules increased the quadratic price term from $0.007 169 
to $0.037/m6. The quadratic price term of $0.011/m6 approximated historical prices in blocks 1 to 3 up 170 
to consumption of 116 m3/customer/quarter. Uniform rates tested combinations of many prices and 171 
flat charges. One series varied a single price from 1/3 to 6 times the historically average price of 172 
$0.42/m3 with no flat charges. Other series varied flat charges from -$45 to +$45/customer/quarter at 173 
three separate  prices, $0.71, $1.06, and $1.41/m3. Here, negative flat charges represent a utility 174 
incentive and return money to customers who use less water than a proscribed target. Alternatively, 175 
high flat charges may encourage customers to discontinue piped service and seek alternative sources. 176 
To date, few utilities use negative flat fees and utilities prefer to keep rather than drive away customers. 177 
Deductive modeling and rate structure simulation can serve as a useful tool to evaluate these effects. 178 
Results 179 
Figure 2 shows piped water demand responses for the rate structure and price schedule simulations. 180 
The average price (top) is calculated as total utility revenues from all Monte Carlo simulations divided by 181 
total piped water use. The marginal price (bottom) is the price paid at the average piped water use. 182 
Table 4 shows ranges of point price elasticities calculated using the two prices. Observe: 183 
1. At low prices (at or below historical prices), the model predicts inelastic demand responses for 184 
all rate structures. Average and marginal prices both give similar elasticity estimates.  185 
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2. Demand responses appear more price elastic as prices increase above $US 0.5/m3. Also, there is 186 
a wider range in elasticity estimates. 187 
3. At high prices for the linear rate structure, marginal prices are higher than average prices for the 188 
same piped water use; price response is more elastic when calculated from average prices.  189 
4. Conversely, marginal prices are the same for IBR with shrinking block width and uniform price 190 
schedules that vary flat charges. In these cases the calculated slope is zero, elasticity infinite, 191 
and marginal price is not a meaningful indicator. Deductive modeled households respond to 192 
expected total cost (which includes flat charges), some discontinue piped water use, and switch 193 
to alternative sources. Piped water use changes but the marginal price variable does not 194 
capture the changing flat charge component of the piped water rate structure. 195 
5. The uniform rate structure and price schedules with (i) no flat charges and (ii) price of $1.41/m3 196 
with changing flat charges show the most elastic price responses. 197 
At sufficiently high prices, each rate structure can significantly reduce piped water use from the use 198 
observed in 2005. However, rate structure motivated water conservation imposes significant costs on 199 
households (Figure 3, bottom left). For example, at historical piped water rates, the average household 200 
pays about $240/year in total costs for their piped water, alternative sources, and coping behaviors. If 201 
the utility adopts an IBR with shrinking block width rate structure to reduce piped water use to 120 202 
m3/customer/year, the average household’s total costs would increase 42% to $338/year. Here, total 203 
cost represents economic efficiency because it measures the total losses (or gains) when all households 204 
respond to different rate structures for piped water. Although the IBR, IBR with shrinking block width, 205 
and linear price rate structures are economically efficient choices to encourage water conservation, they 206 
still impose significant additional costs on users compared to historical costs. 207 
The uniform price schedules with low prices and no flat charges are economically efficient and impose 208 
low total costs for users, but recover only a small fraction of utility costs (Figure 3, middle). Here, we 209 
calculate cost recovery by dividing utility revenues by the Amman utility’s variable and fixed costs of 210 
approximately $0.94/m3 and $42.5/customer/year (Alqam et al. 2008). Note that historical price 211 
schedules (which significantly subsidize use in blocks 1 and 2) recover less than 65% of utility costs. 212 
Certain revenue neutral IBR, IBR with shrinking block width, and linear price (quadratic charge) price 213 
schedules simultaneously reduce water use to approximately 120 m3/customer/year. However, other 214 
revenue neutral IBR and uniform rate structures with and without flat charges impose lower total costs 215 
on users but maintain water use near the historical average of approximately 150 m3/customer/year. 216 
Plotting the user distribution against the cumulative share of total piped water charges users pay shows 217 
cost distribution among users for the revenue neutral piped water price schedules (Figure 4). These 218 
Lorenz curves show more equitable cost allocation compared to the 2005 historical schedule. For 219 
example, the uniform and IBR price schedules collect nearly 18% of total utility revenues from the first 220 
45% of users with the lowest water use. In contrast, the 2005 price schedule collected less than 5% of 221 
total revenues from the same fraction of users and more than 60% of total revenues from the largest 222 
10% of users. In Figure 4, larger deviations from the 1:1 line of perfect equity (that represents a flat 223 
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charge structure where all users pay the same amount regardless of use) highlight larger cost allocation 224 
inequalities. We quantify inequalities by the Gini coefficient which measures the area between the 1:1 225 
line of perfect equity and the Lorenz curve. Thus, the uniform price schedule with a uniform charge of 226 
$0.71/m3 and flat charge of $23/quarter appears most equitable. All the revenue neutral piped water 227 
price schedules more equitably allocate costs among users than the 2005 rate schedule, however, they 228 
impose significant additional total costs on users compared to the historical rate structure. 229 
The top left and right panels of Figure 3 show the tradeoffs between cost allocation equity, water use, 230 
and user’s total costs for each simulated rate structure. Here two results are notable. First, the IBR and 231 
linear price structures simultaneously and significantly improve cost allocation among users and reduce 232 
water use compared to the 2005 historical rate structure. However, these two rate structures also 233 
significantly increase user’s total costs and are not the most economically efficient options to promote 234 
cost equity. Second, uniform price schedules with (i) low prices and no flat charges, and (ii) a price of 235 
$0.71/m3 and flat charges improve cost allocation among users and maintain user’s total costs near 236 
historical levels. These price schedules more efficiently promote more equitable cost allocation among 237 
users, but maintain water use at historical levels and are not conservation oriented. 238 
Figure 5 further highlights tradeoffs among rate setting objectives for the uniform rate structure’s flat 239 
charge (x axis) and price (traces) components. Flat charges at or just above $0/customer/quarter most 240 
equitably allocate costs among users and have similar Gini coefficient values for all prices. As flat 241 
charges fall below zero, water use is largely insensitive to the uniform price component. However, as flat 242 
charges increase, water use decreases faster at higher uniform prices. Several combinations of uniform 243 
prices and flat charges between -$10 and $10/customer/quarter appear to simultaneously maintain 244 
user’s total costs near historical levels and promote full cost recovery. For example, price schedules with 245 
prices of $1.06 and $1.41/m3 and no flat charges slightly increase users’ total costs, attain full cost 246 
recovery, maintain historical piped water use levels, and improve cost allocation among users. Flat 247 
charges above $25/customer/quarter appear to make the Amman utility into a profit making enterprise 248 
and are likely not desirable. Deductive model results highlight demand responses for different rate 249 
structures and show tradeoffs among important rate-setting objectives such as to promote efficiency, 250 
encourage conservation, recover costs, and more equitably allocate costs among users. 251 
Discussion, Limitations, and Further Research 252 
The price elasticity, water use, cost recovery, cost allocation, and total cost (economic efficiency) results 253 
presented above highlight several significant findings which we now identify and discuss further. 254 
First, deductive modeling of household water management decisions and simulation under the existing 255 
mixed IBR/linear price (quadratic charge) structure in Amman, Jordan at low historical prices reproduces 256 
the highly inelastic price elasticity of demand found by an econometric study over the same time period 257 
(Salman et al. 2008). Second, demand responses for the other rate structures simulated at low 258 
historical-like prices is also very price-inelastic.  259 
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Third, demand response becomes much more price-elastic at prices above $0.5/m3. However, the 260 
magnitude of the demand response for non-linear rate structures depends on both the rate structure 261 
simulated and price variable used. These mixed results help explain contradictory findings by prior 262 
econometric studies (Kenney et al. 2008; Nieswiadomy and Cobb 1993; Nieswiadomy and Molina 1989; 263 
Olmstead et al. 2007; Stevens et al. 1992). 264 
Fourth, rate structures and price schedules pose important tradeoffs among rate setting objectives such 265 
as to promote efficiency, encourage conservation, recover costs, and equitably allocate costs among 266 
users. To recover 100% of costs and achieve revenue neutrality, the Amman utility will likely need to 267 
increase above $1.0/m3 the average price paid by the typical customer. These price increases are similar 268 
to recent results reported by a cost recovery study for Amman (Alqam et al. 2008). However, Alqam et 269 
al. (2008) only examined uniform price schedules and did not consider effects on efficiency, water use, 270 
or cost allocation among users. In this regard, the efficient, revenue neutral rate structures that keep 271 
users’ total costs low are uniform price schedules with prices between $0.71 and $1.41/m3 and flat 272 
charges between $-11 and $23/customer/quarter (see Figure 4). These price schedules also maintain 273 
water use, more equitably allocate costs, and will, on average, only increase user’s total cost by 274 
$80/customer/year compared to the historical rate structure. The existing mixed IBR/linear rate 275 
structure subsidizes most users in the first two blocks, recovers less than 65% of costs, and motivates 276 
significant increases in prices and user’s total costs to achieve revenue neutrality. 277 
Deductive model results also show that IBR, IBR with shrinking block width, and linear price schedules 278 
appear conservation oriented because they can significantly reduce water use, recover costs, and more 279 
equitably allocate costs among users. However, these rate structures, on average, increase user’s total 280 
costs more than $120/customer/year over the existing rate structure. And despite estimated reductions 281 
of approximately 30 m3/customer/year, the $4/m3 user cost for conserved water with these rate 282 
structures is much more expensive than the $1-2/m3 cost of the Amman utility’s other supply options, 283 
Zara Ma’een, the Disi aquifer, and the Red-Dead canal (Alqam et al. 2008). The conservation oriented 284 
rate structures only become attractive if the comparison point is a revenue-neutral uniform structure 285 
discussed above rather than the existing mixed IBR/linear rate structure. 286 
Rosenberg et al. (2007) present limitations of deductive modeling which we summarize here. First, the 287 
model assumes simulated households minimize costs to meet initial estimates of water use. These initial 288 
estimates set upper bounds for optimal uses; simulated customers can choose from an exhaustive set of 289 
supply or conservation actions to set use at or below the initial estimate, but they have no incentive to 290 
increase use beyond initial estimates such as to expand their garden area or take longer or more 291 
frequent showers should water prices decrease or water become more available. Put another way, the 292 
model is built and calibrated to current and prior water use behaviors observed when only a small 293 
volume of cheap water was available to users. Second, households minimize their expected water 294 
management costs rather than maximize utility or minimize cost deviations. This decision criteria 295 
assumes households are risk neutral not risk adverse or risk taking. Yet, deductive model calibration and 296 
verification suggest Amman households behave as if they minimize their expected water-related costs. 297 
And third, households minimize their expected costs with perfect information about the piped water 298 
rate structure and alternative water management actions. Carter and Milon (2005) and Gaudin (2006) 299 
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report that households often have limited knowledge of the rate structure and price schedule. However, 300 
recent work in Jordan finds that households understand the historical rate structure and the steep 301 
additional costs associated with consuming in higher blocks (Rosenberg et al. 2008). 302 
Based on the above results and limitations, further research should empirically verify deductive model 303 
results for all rate structures at prices both significantly above and below historical prices. Verification 304 
will require either (i) a fortuitous cross-sectional time-series dataset, or (ii) observing changes in water 305 
use associated with a community intervention study where random subsamples of the community faced 306 
different rate structures and price schedules. Adding and crossing price interventions with informational 307 
interventions (such as water audits or bill inserts that indicate the price paid, ways to save water or 308 
money, use history, and/or use compared to community norms) could simultaneously disentangle the 309 
combined effects of price and price information. Analyzing results using both econometric and 310 
deductive models can help improve both types of models. 311 
Conclusions 312 
Deductive modeling identifies the mix of actions and water uses a perfectly informed household adopts 313 
to reduce its expected water management costs given a probability distribution of piped water 314 
availability. Monte Carlo simulations show distributions of customer responses and cumulative citywide 315 
effects, including piped water use, total user costs, utility cost recovery, and cost allocation among 316 
users. We calculate price elasticity by simulating household responses to several price schedules and 317 
observing resulting changes in average piped water use and prices across the price schedules. 318 
Model calibration reproduces both the average and distribution of billed piped water use in Amman, 319 
Jordan in 2005. The model was further verified against (i) a distribution of willingness-to-pay to avoid 320 
network shortage reported by a contingent valuation study, and (ii) an econometric price elasticity 321 
estimate for Amman between 1997 and 2006. Subsequently simulating IBR, IBR with shrinking block 322 
widths, linear price, and uniform rate structures at prices ranging from 0.5 to 8 times historical values 323 
allows cross-sectional analysis in a single community and suggests: 324 
1. The Amman utility will need to increase prices to or above $1.0/m3 to recover costs. Uniform 325 
structures with prices between $0.71 and $1.41/m3 and flat charges between $-11 and 326 
$23/customer/quarter will likely pose the least total cost burden to users. 327 
2. At higher prices, uniform or IBR structures show the most elastic price responses. 328 
3. However, at higher prices, price responses vary and depend on the average or marginal price 329 
variable used to calculate elasticity. 330 
4. Conservation-oriented IBR, IBR with shrinking block width, and linear price rate structures seem 331 
best able to simultaneously reduce water use, recover costs, and more equitably allocate costs 332 
among users. However, these rate structures significantly increase users’ total costs with the likely 333 
benefits from conservation less than the added costs the rate structures impose on users. 334 
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5. The conservation-oriented rate structures may be desirable if compared to a revenue-neutral 335 
uniform rate structure rather than the existing and historical mixed IBR/linear rate structure. 336 
6. The Amman utility can adjust flat and uniform price components of a uniform structure to 337 
simultaneously promote efficiency, recover costs, and more equitably allocate costs among users. 338 
Overall, deductive modeling and rate structure simulation shows how to integrate various rate 339 
structure, pricing, conservation, water availability, and other household behavioral factors into a 340 
common approach to model and understand household water use in intermittent supply systems. 341 
Further, modeling indentifies tradeoffs among rate structures and price schedule components to 342 
achieve key rate setting objectives such as to promote efficiency, reduce water use, recover costs, and 343 
more equitably allocate costs among users. 344 
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Table 1. Econometric studies reporting price elasticities of water demand for 
multiple rate structures 
Year Location
Sample 
size
Type Uniform
Increasing 
block
Decreasing 
block
Price 
variablesa
Methodb r2
1. 1988 Mass., US 85 Aggregate, panel -0.41 -0.54 -0.69 AP 2SLS 0.18 - 0.55 Stevens et al (1992)
2. 1976-1985 Denton, TX 101 Cross-sectional, 
time-series
-0.55 -0.36 MP, D 2SLS, IV 0.16 - 0.26 Nieswiadomy and 
Molina (1989)
3. 1984 US 109 Aggregate, panel -0.17 to -0.63 -0.27 to -0.46 AP, MP, SP Logit 0.22 - 0.60 Nieswiadomy and Cobb 
(1993)
4. 1996-1998 11 US Cities 1082 Cross-sectional, 
panel
-0.33 -0.59 DCC Olmstead et al (2007)
5. 2000-2005 Aurora, CA 10,000 Cross-sectional, 
time-series
-0.6 -0.65 AP FE-IV 0.4 Kenney et al (2008)
Notes:
a. AP=average price; MP=marginal price; SP=Shin price; D=difference
b. 2SLS=Two-stage least squares; IV=instrument variables; DCC=discrete/continuous choice, FE-IV=fixed effects instrument variables
Reference
Data Set Characteristics Price Elasticities for Rate Structures Regression Attributes
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Table 2. Meta analysis of water demand studies reporting the influence of 
rate structures on price-elasticity of water demand 
Study Descriptor Espy et al (1997) Dalhuisen et al (2003)
1967 - 1993 1967 - 1998
24 64
127 314
Increasing blocks 0.34 - 0.62 0.35 - 0.54
Declining blocks 0.18-0.38 0.14 - 0.32
Regression methods Semi-log; Box-Cox Linear; Box-Cox
0.41 - 0.81 0.22
Years
Articles reviewed
Model estimates
Relative influence
r2  
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Table 3. Price schedules for different simulated rate structures 
Price Flat charge Price Flat charge Price Flat charge
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 ($/m6) ($/m3) ($/quarter) ($/m3) ($/quarter) ($/m3) ($/quarter)
1. 0.12 (20) 0.13 (20) 0.35 (90) 0.88 (1000) 0.36 (5) 0.39 (5) 1.06 (20) 2.63 (1000) 0.007 0.14 0 0.71 -11.28 1.41 -45.12
2. 0.24 (20) 0.26 (20) 0.71 (90) 1.75 (1000) 0.36 (8) 0.39 (8) 1.06 (20) 2.63 (1000) 0.010 0.28 0 0.71 5.64 1.41 -22.56
3. 0.30 (20) 0.33 (20) 0.88 (90) 2.19 (1000) 0.36 (10) 0.39 (10) 1.06 (20) 2.63 (1000) 0.011 0.42 0 0.71 11.28 1.41 -11.28
4. 0.36 (20) 0.39 (20) 1.06 (90) 2.63 (1000) 0.36 (15) 0.39 (15) 1.06 (30) 2.63 (1000) 0.013 0.71 0 0.71 22.56 1.41 11.28
5. 0.42 (20) 0.46 (20) 1.23 (90) 3.06 (1000) 0.36 (30) 0.39 (30) 1.06 (60) 2.63 (1000) 0.014 1.06 0 0.71 45.12 1.41 22.56
6. 0.48 (20) 0.52 (20) 1.41 (90) 3.50 (1000) 0.017 1.23 0 1.06 -22.56 1.41 45.12
7. 0.72 (20) 0.78 (20) 2.12 (90) 5.25 (1000) 0.021 1.41 0 1.06 -11.28
8. 0.96 (20) 1.04 (20) 2.82 (90) 7.00 (1000) 0.025 2.12 0 1.06 11.28
9. 1.44 (20) 1.57 (20) 4.23 (90) 10.51 (1000) 0.031 2.40 0 1.06 22.56
10. 1.92 (20) 2.09 (20) 5.64 (90) 14.01 (1000) 0.037 2.82 0 1.06 33.84
11. 2.40 (20) 2.61 (20) 7.05 (90) 17.51 (1000) 1.06 45.12
a. Price in $/m3 and block width in m3/quarter for each block
b. Variable term of $0.014/m3
Linear price 
(quadratic charge)b
Uniform price
 ($/m3 [m3/quarter])a  ($/m3 [m3/quarter])a
Increasing block Increasing block - shrinking block width
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Table 4. Calculated price elasticities for different rate structures, prices, and price variables 
Average pricea Marginal priceb Average pricea Marginal priceb
Increasing block 0.00 to -0.01 0.00 to -0.01 -0.78 to -1.82 -0.51 to -1.49
IBR-shrinking block width -0.48 to -0.41 #DIV/0!
Linear price (quadratic charge) -0.08 to -0.11 -0.06 to -0.10 -0.92 to -1.06 -0.60 to -0.72
Uniform (no flat charge) 0.00 to -0.01 0.00 to -0.01 -1.47 to -2.39 -1.47 to -2.39
Uniform ($0.71/m3 with flat charges) -0.02 to -0.05 #DIV/0! -0.32 to -0.58 #DIV/0!
Uniform ($1.06/m3 with flat charges) -0.05 to -0.11 #DIV/0! -0.81 to -0.98 #DIV/0!
Uniform ($1.41/m3 with flat charges) -0.04 to -0.10 #DIV/0! -1.53 to -2.98 #DIV/0!
Historical -0.02 to -0.03 -0.16 to -0.16
Notes:
a. Average price = (Total revenues from piped water sales) / (Total piped water use)
b. Marginal price = Marginal price at average piped water use
Historical Prices (inelastic range) Higher Prices (elastic range)
Rate Structure
 
 
